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Abstract—Information leaks through side channels are a per-
vasive problem in security-critical applications. Functional side
channels arise when an attacker knows that the secret value
of a server stays fixed for a certain time, and can observe the
server executes on a sequence of different public inputs, each
paired with the same secret input. Thus for each secret, the
attackers observe a (partial) function from public values to (for
instance) running time, and they can compare these functions
for different secrets. First, we define a notion of noninterference
for functional side channels. We focus on the case of noisy
observations, where we demonstrate on examples that there
is a practical functional side channel in programs that would
be deemed information-leak-free using the standard definition.
Second, we develop a framework and techniques for debugging
programs for functional side channels. We adapt existing results
and algorithms in functional data analysis (such as functional
clustering) to discover the existence of side channels. We use
a functional extension of standard decision tree learning to
pinpoint the code fragments causing a side channel if there is
one. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performance of our
tool FUSCHIA on a series of micro-benchmarks, as well as on
realistic Java programs with thousands of methods. FUSCHIA is
able to discover (and locate in the code) functional side channels,
including one that was since fixed by the original developers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attacks are practical and widespread [1], [2],
[3]. A side channel arises if the attacker can infer the value
of secret inputs (or some of their properties) based on public
inputs, runtime observations, and the source code of the pro-
gram. A typical example is an online pharmacy, where based
on the number of rounds of interaction and the processing
time, an eavesdropper can infer a user’s prescriptions on file.
We consider the setting where the secret input stays fixed
across a number of interactions. This gives rise to functional
observations: for a secret input, we observe the program on a
number of public inputs. For a secret input s, we thus obtain a
partial function fs from public inputs to runtime observations.
In this paper, we focus on timing side channels, where the
attacker observes the running time of the program. However,
our methods apply to other types of side channels equally well.
Functional side channels. We adapt the classical definition
of noninterference to functional side channels, where two
secret inputs s and t are indistinguishable for the attacker if
the functions fs and ft are equal. However, in the presence
of noise (a common situation for timing measurements), we
cannot require an exact equality of functions. Instead, we de-
fine two functional observations to be indistinguishable when
the distance between them is small. We show on examples
that it is critical to choose the distance that corresponds to
the characteristics of the environment noise, otherwise side
channels might be undetected.
Problem. We focus on automatically discovering functional
timing side channels in programs, and on pinpointing code
regions that contribute to creating the side channel.
Algorithms. As functional timing side channels are hard to
detect statically, and are clearly beyond the scope of current
program analysis tools, we turn to dynamic analysis methods.
We build on the results and algorithms from the theory of
functional data analysis. We use functional data clustering to
find timing side channels and estimate their strength. It allows
us to compute an equivalence relation on secret inputs that
models the distinguishing power of the attacker. If this relation
has multiple equivalence classes, there is an information leak.
In order to find what parts of the code caused the leak, we
identify what properties are common for secrets in the same
cluster (equivalence class), and what separates the clusters. We
consider the properties to be program internals such as meth-
ods called or basic blocks executed for a given secret value.
We present a functional extension of decision tree inference
techniques to identify code regions that explain differences
among clusters. These code regions are thus suspect of being
a root cause of the functional side channel.
Experiments. We evaluate our techniques on micro-
benchmarks and on seven larger case studies. The case studies
serve to evaluate scalability and performance on real-world
applications. These programs have up to thousands of methods,
and we show that our tool is able to find side channels, and
pinpoint their cause in the code in under 2 minutes.
Contributions. Our main contributions are:
• Definition of functional noninterference in the presence
of noisy observations. We demonstrate functional side
channels in programs that would be deemed information-
leak-free using the standard (non-functional) definition.
• Algorithms: We adapt existing theory and algorithms for
functional data clustering to discover the existence of side
channels. We develop a functional extension of decision
tree learning to locate the code regions causing a side
channel if there is one.
• Evaluation: we show on microbenchmarks and larger case
studies that FUSCHIA (FUnctional Side CHannel Invest-
gator and Analyzer) is able to scalably discover (and
locate in the code) functional side channels, including
one that was since fixed by the original developers.
II. OVERVIEW
First, we illustrate what an attacker can infer based on
functional observations, even in the presence of noise. Second,
we show how our tool FUSCHIA can help in detecting such
functional side channels.
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A. Illustrating functional side channels
We consider the setting of server programs with public and
secret variables. We focus on the (very common) situation
where secret values stay constant for some amount of time
(e.g., number of friends a person has on a social network).
The eavesdropper can try to infer the secret value by observing
public parts of a number of client requests and server responses
(for instance, number of packets sent, and their size, can be
publicly observable). Note that in our setting, the eavesdropper
does not choose public values—these are chosen by the
legitimate users that the eavesdropper observes.
Let us consider the classical definition of confidentiality:–
noninterference. A program is unsafe iff for all pairs of secret
values s1 and s2, there exists a public value p such that the
behavior of the program on (s1, p) is observably different
than on (s2, p). If our observable is the running time T , then:
∀s1, s2 : ∃p : T (s1, p) 6= T (s2, p).
In our setting, however, we have functional data. For each
secret value, we observe the running time of a program
on a number of public values, and the noninterference then
becomes: ∀s1, s2 : (λp.T (s1, p)) 6= (λp.T (s2, p)). In other
words, the program is unsafe if the two secret values do not
correspond to the same (partial) function of public inputs.
Side channels in the presence of noise. Quantitative obser-
vations of a program’s runtime behavior are often noisy. For in-
stance, running the same program twice on the same machine
results in different measurements of running time. Observing
the program remotely adds further level of noise. Classical
definitions of confidentiality properties therefore need to be
adapted to noisy environments. In the noisy environment,
no two observations are equal, and our definition needs to
include ε tolerance: ∀s1, s2 : d(λp.T (s1, p), λp.T (s2, p)) ≥ .
In this definition, d is a distance between two functions.
The distance is suitably chosen, typically based on the noise
expected for a particular use case. For instance, to recover
(the spirit of) the classical definition, we can use the distance:
dpoint(f1, f2) = supx |f1(x)− f2(x)|
However, we now demonstrate that the distance dpoint is
not the only option, and that depending on the type of noise,
different distances are needed. In particular, we show that if
we use distance dpoint , we could certify a program to be safe
even though some secret information leaks.
a) Gaussian noise (pointwise independent, mean 0):
Consider the two functional observations (red and black)
of a program in Figure 1. On the x-axis, we have public
values, and on y-axis, there is the running time. The red
function corresponds to secret value s1 and the black function
corresponds to secret value s2. The eavesdropper can produce
this graph easily by trying all possible inputs on their machine
before hand. At runtime, the eavesdropper collects the public
inputs and the running time, and tries to learn the secret by
matching the observed data to the red or black functions.
In this example, we assume that the noise for each pair of
public-secret inputs is independent and identically distributed
to the noise for other inputs, and furthermore we assume
that it is distributed according to the Gaussian distribution
Fig. 1: Two functional observations of running time.
with mean 0. Let us consider ε of 3ms, and then apply
our definition with distance dpoint . We see that that the two
functional observations are ε-close for this distance, so the
attacker cannot infer the secret value (s1 or s2).
However, the functional observations are clearly very differ-
ent, and an eavesdropper can reliably learn the secret if there
are many observations. Theoretically, this can be captured
for instance by considering the distance to be the L1 norm
between the two functions, that is, the sum (integral) of the
absolute value of the difference of the two functions over
an interval of interest. Practically, this example shows that
considering the supremum of the point-wise distance (dpoint )
is insufficient to detect all side channels, as the eavesdropper
learns from all inputs they see, not just one of them.
b) Gaussian noise (pointwise independent, mean C): Let
us consider the case where the noise is again Gaussian, but
with a non-zero mean. The threat model we consider is that the
mean is fixed but unknown to the attacker. This case arises for
instance if the eavesdropper is remote, and cannot determine
reliably the delay introduced by the network and separate it
from the noise caused by the remote machine.
Consider a program with two possible functional behaviors
(red and black) pictured in Figure 2 (a), where the red behavior
corresponds to secret value s1 and the black behavior to secret
value s2. Note that the attacker can obtain this graph by
running the program for many inputs on their own machine.
At runtime, the attacker interacts with the remote server
running the same instance of the application with a fixed
secret value. The green timing function in Figure 2 (b) shows
different values of execution time for different public input
values obtained from the interaction with the remote server.
Fig. 2: (a) Attacker local observations. Black or red functional
behaviors. (b) Attacker observes different requests (public
inputs) to the remote server and obtains the green timing
function. The attacker realizes that the distance d1 based on the
first derivatives between green and black functions is smaller
than the distance between green and red functions.
Green function looks far apart from both local observations
(black and red functions in Figure 2 (a)). However, due to
the effect of remote observations, the attacker knows that the
observation of running time is off by an unknown constant.
Therefore, the attacker is in effect observing only the
shape of the function, i.e., its first derivative. The appropriate
distance is therefore over the derivatives of the functions, for
instance the L2-norm of the difference of the two functions, as
used in the literature [4], [5] to calculate the distance between
green function with red and black functions. The eavesdropper
can use this distance to calculate that the green function is
closer to the black function than the red function (and if the
difference is greater than ε, the value of the secret leaks).
We have shown situations where the distance is the L1
norm, or the L2 norm over the first derivative of the functions.
In general, in this paper we will consider distances that are
given by p-norms over k-th derivatives of functions.
B. Debugging functional side channels with FUSCHIA
1) Using FUSCHIA to debug Eclipse Jetty: We illustrate
how our tool FUSCHIA can be used for discovering and
explaining information leaks arising due to functional side
channels. We analyze the Jetty.util.security package
of Eclipse Jetty web server. The package has Credential
class which had a timing side channel. This vulnerability was
analyzed in [6] and fixed initially in [7]. Then, the developers
noticed that the implementation in [7] can leak still leak in-
formation and fixed this issue with a new implementation [8].
We consider this new implementation and apply FUSCHIA to
check its security. The final fix was done few months later [9]
(but before we reported our finding to the developers).
Problem. The secret input is the password stored at the
server, the public input is the guess by the user. The goal
of the defender is to determine whether an attacker can
infer properties of the (unchanging) secret if the attacker can
observe the timing for many public inputs. FUSCHIA helps
with this, and helps the user pinpoint the problematic code.
Side channel discovery. The defender starts by choosing a
finite set of secret and public values. For this example, the
defender uses libFuzzer [10], a popular evolutionary fuzzer.
The defender chooses 800 different secret passwords and
800 different guesses (ordered by length). The lengths of
passwords are at most 20 characters. For each secret value,
FUSCHIA varies 800 different guesses and measures the ex-
Fig. 3: String equality in Eclipse Jetty (s1 secret, s2 public).
boolean stringEquals(String s1, String s2) {
if (s1 == s2) return true;
if (s1 == null || s2 == null) return false;
boolean result = true;
int l1 = s1.length(), l2 = s2.length();
if (l1 != l2) result = false;
int l = Math.min(l1, l2);
for (int i = 0; i < l; ++i)
result &= (s1.charAt(i) == s2.charAt(i));
return result; }
ecution time of the Jetty. Figure 4 (a) shows 800 different
execution time functions (one for each secret value).
The defender provides the notion of a distance and the
bound ε. In this case, we consider Lpoints between the first
derivatives, and the bound ε = 0.001. FUSCHIA discovers 20
classes of observations. Figure 4 (b) shows 20 clusters detected
by FUSCHIA. Since every cluster corresponds to a distinct
class of observation, the defender concludes that there are 20
classes of observations in Jetty util.security package
that leak information about the secret via side channels.
Side channel explanation. Now, the defender wants to know
what properties of program internal leak through the timing
side channel and use this information for further analysis
such as elimination of the leaks. FUSCHIA helps the defender
with inferring what properties are common for secrets in the
same cluster, and what separates the clusters. We look at
program internals such as methods called or basic blocks
executed during the executions with a given secret value.
This part is done by extending techniques from [11], [12] to
functional setting. It produces a decision tree whose nodes
are labeled by program internal features, and whose leaves
represent sets of secret values inside a cluster. Figure 4
(c) shows the decision tree model learned for Jetty. Us-
ing this model, the defender realizes that the executions of
stringEquals_bblock_118 is what distinguishes the
clusters from each other. This basic block represents the loop
body of the for loop in the method shown in Figure 3.
For instance, the green cluster (third from the bottom of the
center diagram, bottom of the right diagram) corresponds to
the case where stringEquals_bblock_118 is executed
3 times. More specifically, the cluster corresponds to the case
where if the length of public input (user-provided password)
is less than 3, stringEquals_bblock_118 is the length
of public input, and if the length is greater than or equal to
3, stringEquals_bblock_118 is 3. Since the functions
labeled with L3 are obtained for the secret values with the
length of 3, the defender realizes that the minimum of the
lengths of the secret password and the user-provided password
is correlated with the number of execution of the loop (or the
basic block) inside stringEquals, and the minimum of the
lengths is leaking through this basic block. Note that defender
could establish this as FUSCHIA pinpointed the right function.
Remote observation. Now assume that the attacker has the
same version of Jetty application and performs analysis similar
to the one performed by the defender on his local machine.
Consequently, the attacker has obtained the same Figures in 4.
Now, on the remote machine that runs the same instance of
jetty, the attacker wants to guess the length of the (fixed)
password. The attacker sends the same guesses as his local
analysis over the network and observes the execution time.
The new remote observation is shown with green function in
Figure 4 (a). Now, to get rid of additive noise effects, the
attacker considers the first derivative of timing models and
finds the closet cluster to green function among the discovered
clusters. Figure 4 (b) shows the result of this analysis where it
assigns the remote timing observations to pink cluster. Since
jetty.util.security.
Credential.stringEquals bblock 118
jetty.util.security.
Credential.stringEquals bblock 118
jetty.util.security.
Credential.stringEquals bblock 118
= L1 6= L1
= L2 6= L2
= L3 6= L3
Fig. 4: (a) Jetty functional data clusters. The attacker observes green timing function for remote instance of jetty server. (b)
The attacker correctly recognizes that the timing observations (green function) belong to pink cluster (the middle cluster)
using the distances between the first derivative of timing functions. (c) Learned decision tree model. Number of calls to
stringEquals_bblock_118 (basic block at line 118 of stringEquals) discriminates different classes of observations.
this cluster corresponds to passwords with the length 10, the
attacker correctly discovers the length of password running on
the remote machine is 10.
2) Inside FUSCHIA: We describe how FUSCHIA produces
the diagrams. To produce the middle diagram of Figure 4,
FUSCHIA converts the execution time of secret values over
public guesses to timing functions in the domain of the
public guesses for each secret value using B-spline basis [13].
Then, it applies a functional data clustering algorithm to
discover different classes of observations in time (described
in Section IV). This clustering algorithm is non-parametric
functional clustering [4] that works in two steps: first, it applies
the L-norm distance function over every pair of functions to
summarize the distance between them in a distance matrix,
and then it uses constrained clustering algorithms to group
similar functions together (described in V-A).
For explaining the clusters and producing the decision
tree in the right diagram of Figure 4, FUSCHIA executes an
instrumented version of the program with Javassist [14] on
the same inputs as before and obtains the basic blocks taken
for each secret value over the public input values. Therefore,
for each secret value, the evaluation of a basic block is a
function in the domain of public input. We label the functions
with categorical values and use off-the-shelf decision tree
learning algorithm. The tool learns a decision tree model that
discriminates each cluster of timing functions based on the
basic block calls (described in Section IV).
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We develop a framework for detecting and explaining infor-
mation leaks due to execution time of programs and we focus
leaks due to functional observations by the attacker.
A. Threat Model
We assume that the attacker has access to the source code
of the application and she can sample execution-times for
the application arbitrarily many times on her local machine
with different combinations of secret and public values. As
a result, she can infer an arbitrarily accurate model of the
application’s true execution time. During an attack, the attacker
intends to guess a fixed secret by observing the application on
a remote machine. These remote observations, however, may
not correspond to the timing model inferred by the attacker
because of several factors, such as, i) network delays and
noises, and ii) masking delays added by the administrator to
every response (potentially as a function of public inputs) to
mitigate the side channel. We assume that the attacker knows
an upper bound on the mitigation model, but she does not
know the specific model parameters.
B. Timing Model and Functional Observations
Let R and R≥0 be the set of reals and positive reals.
Variables with unspecified types are assumed to be real-valued.
Definition III.1. The timing model [[P]] of a program P is a
tuple (X,Y,Σ, δ) where:
• X= {x1, . . . , xn} is the set of secret-input variables,
• Y = {y1, y2, . . . , ym} is the set of public-input variables,
• Σ ⊆ Rn is a finite set of secret-inputs, and
• δ : Rn × Rm → R≥0 is the execution-time function of
the program as a function of secret and public inputs.
a) Functional observations: A functional observation
of the program P for a secret input s ∈ Σ is the func-
tion δ(s) defined as y ∈ Rm 7→ δ(s,y). Let F be the
set of all functional observations. In order to characterize
indistinguishability between two functional observations, we
introduce a distance function di,p : F × F → R≥0 on
functional observations, for i, p ∈ N, defined as:
di,p
def
= (f, g) 7→
(∫
y∈Y
(
f (i)(y)− g(i)(y)
)p
dy
) 1
p
,
where f (i) represents i-th derivative (wrt y) of the function f
and 0-th derivative is the function itself. The distance function
di,p corresponds to the p-norm distance between i-th deriva-
tives of the functional observations. Given ε > 0, we say that
secrets s and s′ are ε-indistinguishable (or indistinguishable
when ε is clear from context) if di,p(δ(s), δ(s′)) ≤ ε.
Depending upon the context, as we argued in the previous
section, different distance functions (and different bounds ε)
may be applicable. For instance, the distance between first
derivatives may be applicable when the shape of the functional
observation is leaking information about the secret (while ob-
servations themselves may be arbitrarily close) and the second
derivatives may be applicable when the number of growth
spurts in the observations is leaking information. Similarly,
in the situations where the attacker knows the mitigation
model—say temporal noises added to the signal are n-th order
polynomials of the public inputs—two functional observations
whose n-th derivatives are close in the p-norm sense may be
indistinguishable to the attacker. Finally, depending upon the
specific situation, an analyst may wish to use more nuanced
notion of distance by taking a weighted combination [15] of
various distance functions characterized by di,p. To keep the
technical discourse simple, we will not formally introduce such
weighted combinations in this paper.
b) Noninterference: Noninterference is a well-
established [16], [17], [18] criterion to guarantee absence of
side-channel vulnerabilities. A program P is said to satisfy
the noninterference property if:
∀y ∈ Rm∀s, s′ ∈ Σ we have δ(s,y) = δ(s′,y). (1)
To account for the measurement noises in the observation
of the execution-time, it is prudent (see, e.g., [6]) to relax
the notion of noninterference from exact equality in timing
observations to a parameterized neighborhood. For a given
ε>0, a program P satisfies ε-approximate noninterference if:
∀y ∈ Rm∀s, s′ ∈ Σ we have |δ(s,y)− δ(s′,y)| ≤ ε. (2)
We adapt the notion of ε-approximate noninterference in
our setting of functional observations by generalizing previous
notions of noninterference. We say that a program satisfies
functional ε-approximate noninterference if
∀s, s′ ∈ Σ we have di,p(δ(s), δ(s′)) ≤ ε. (3)
where di,p is a distance function over functional observations
defined earlier. For the rest of the paper we assume a fixed
distance function d over functional observations.
c) Quantifying Information Leakage: The notion of non-
interference requires that the attacker should deduce nothing
about the secret inputs from observing execution time for
various public inputs. However, one can argue that achiev-
ing noninterference is neither possible nor desirable, because
oftentimes programs need to reveal information that depends
on the secret inputs. We therefore need a notion of information
leakage. Shannon entropy, guessing entropy, and min-entropy
are three prevalent information metrics [19] to quantify in-
formation leakage in programs. Number of distinguishable
observations provide a practical upper-bound [20], [21] on
the information leakage. In this paper, we use the number of
distinguishable functional observation clusters as a yardstick
for quantitative information leaks.
IV. DATA-DRIVEN DISCOVERY AND EXPLANATION
The space of program inputs are often too large (po-
tentially infinite) to exhaustively explore even for medium-
sized programs. This necessitates a data-driven approach for
discovery and explanation of functional side channels. In the
proposed approach, an analyst provides a set of interesting
secret and public input pairs (using domain knowledge or
fuzzing techniques), and our tool estimates the execution-
time of the program. The tool exploits functional clustering
approaches to discover functional side channels. To explain
any discovered side channels, our tool instruments the program
to print information about auxiliary variables (e.g., predicates
on secrets and public variables, number of times a method
called, value of some internal variables, number of execution
of a block) for each pair of inputs. To summarize: given such
set of program traces, the key computational problems are a)
to cluster traces exhibiting distinguishable timing behaviors
(discovery) and b) to explain these differences by exploiting
richer information based on program internals.
Hyper-trace Learning. Let Z = {z1, z2, . . . , zr} be the
set of auxiliary variables. An execution trace of a program
P is a tuple (x,y, z, t) ∈ Rn × Rm × Rr × R wherein
x ∈ Σ ⊂ Rn is a value to the secret inputs, y ∈ Rm
is a value to the public inputs, and z ∈ Rr and t ∈ R≥0
are the valuations to the auxiliary variables and estimated
execution time, respectively, of the program for secret and
public input pairs. We further assume that the valuations of
the auxiliary variables deterministically depend only on the
secret and public inputs. To keep execution-time unaffected
from the instrumentation process, we assume that execution-
time for traces is estimated for un-instrumented program. Let
T be a set of execution traces.
As our main objective is to explain the differences on
functional observations due to differences on secret and aux-
iliary variables, we rearrange the raw execution traces T to
functional traces H by combining traces with common values
of secret inputs. Functional traces H are hyper-traces—as they
summarize multiple program executions—that model auxiliary
and timing values as a function of public inputs. A hyper-
trace τ is a tuple (x, (fi(x))ri=1, fT (x)) ∈ Rn × ([Rm →
R])r × [Rm → R] wherein x is a value to the secret input, fi
and fT are functions modeling values of auxiliary variables
zi and execution times, respectively, as a function of public
inputs for secret x. Computation of hyper-traces from a set
of raw-traces is achieved by turning the discrete vectors of
observations (for auxiliary variables as well as execution time)
into smooth functions represented as linear combinations of
appropriate basis functions (e.g. B-spline basis system, Fourier
basis functions, and polynomial bases) [22]. In our tool, we
primarily uses B-spline basis functions.
Side-Channel Discovery. Given a set H =
{τ(xj) = (xj , (fi(xj))ri=1, fT (xj))}Nj=1 of hyper-traces,
we use functional clustering over T = {fT (xj)}Nj=1 to detect
different classes of functional observations such that hyper-
traces within a cluster are closer according to the distance
function d than hyper-traces from different clusters. Functional
clustering approaches [23] can be broadly classified into
non-parametric and model-based approaches. Our tool uses
non-parametric functional clustering and implements two
algorithms to cluster indistinguishable observations. These
algorithms—described in Section V-A—take the timing
observations set T , an upper bound K on the number of
clusters, a distance function d, and the indistinguishability
distance ε > 0 as inputs, and returns the “centroids” of
observational functions F = {f1, f2, . . . , fk} for k ≤ K. Our
algorithm guarantees that each centroid fi ∈ F represents
the timing functions for the set of secret values Σi such that
x,x′ ∈ Σi if and only if d(fT (x), fT (x′)) ≤ ε.
Side-Channel Explanation. A (hyper) trace discriminant is
defined as a disjoint partitioning of the product of the secret
variables and auxiliary variables functional spaces along with
a functional observations for each partition that models the
execution time as a function of public inputs. Formally, a trace
discriminant Ψ = (F ,Φ) is a set of functional observations
F = {f1, f2, . . . , fk}—where each fj : Rm → R≥0 models
the execution time as a function of the public input variables—
and a partition Φ = 〈φ1, φ2, . . . , φk〉 where each φj : Rn ×
([Rm → R])r → {T,F} is a predicate over secret inputs and
functions of auxiliary variables. We define size(Ψ) as the
total number of functions in the discriminant Ψ.
Given a hyper-trace τ=(x, (fi)ri=1, fT ) and discriminant
Ψ=(F ,Φ), we define the prediction error e(τ,Ψ) as d(fT , fj)
where 1≤j≤k is the index of the unique value in Ψ such
that (x, (fi)ri=1) |= φj i.e. the predicate φj evaluates to true
for the valuation of secret value x and the auxiliary function
(fi)
r
i=1. Given a set of hyper-traces H = {τ(xj)}Ni=1, and a
discriminant Ψ, we define the fitness of the discriminant as the
mean of prediction errors: µ(H,Ψ) = 1/N∑Ni=1 e(τ(xj),Ψ).
Definition IV.1 (Discriminant Learning Problem). Given a set
of hyper traces H, a bound on the size of the discriminant
K ∈ N, a bound on the error ε ∈ R, the discriminant
learning problem is to find a discriminant Ψ = (F ,Φ) with
size(Ψ) ≤ K and prediction error µ(H,Ψ) ≤ ε.
It follows from Theorem 1 in [24] that the discriminant
learning problem is NP-HARD. For this reason we propose
a practical solution to the discriminant learning problem by
exploiting functional data clustering and decision tree learning.
For learning discriminant model, we adapt decision tree
learning algorithm by converting various functional data-
values into categorical variables. For the auxiliary variable
observations (x, (fi(x)))ri=1 of a secret x ∈ Σ, our al-
gorithm clusters each auxiliary variable into k groups by
employing functional clustering [23]. Let (x, (Li(x)))ri=1
shows secret value x and categorical auxiliary variable Li ={
`1i , `
2
i , . . . , `
k
i
}
for i = 1, . . . , r clustered in k groups.
Given the set of labeled traces (xj , (Li(xj))ri=1, fj) with r
categorical auxiliary variables and the timing function label
fj ∈ F , the decision tree learning algorithms provide an
efficient way to learn hyper-trace discriminants.
V. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
We refer to Algorithm 1 to illustrate the inputs, the output,
and the different steps of FUSCHIA. Given the program P , the
procedure ExecTime extracts execution time over the public
Algorithm 1: FUSCHIA TOOL
Input: Program P , the instrumented version P ′, secret
and public inputs Σ,Π, cluster bound K, distance
function d, and bound ε.
Output: Functional clusters and a decision tree.
1 T = ExecTime(P ,Π,Σ)
2 Z = ExecAux(P ′,Π,Σ)
3 F = FDClustering(T ,K,d,ε)
4 φ = DiscLearning(Z,F)
5 return F , φ.
input for each secret input value. The procedure ExecAux
produces the internal properties of P (method calls and basic
block executions) by executing the same input as ExecTime
procedure using the instrumented version of the program
(P ′). Given the output of ExecTime, an upper bound on
the number of clusters, and the distance picked by the user,
FDClustering discovers classes of observations and returns
the clusters F = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fk〉. Each cluster fi includes a
set of timing functions (corresponds to a set of secret values).
The procedure DiscLearning learns a set of discriminant
predicates 〈φ1, φ2, . . . , φk〉.
A. Implementation
We describe the implementation of each component in
Algorithm 1. All timing measurements in ExecTime of
Algorithm 1 is conducted on an Intel NUC5i5RYH. All other
components in Algorithm 1 are conducted on an Intel i5-2.7
GHz machine with 8 GB memory.
Overall Details. We use functional data analysis library [13]
to create B-spline basis and fit functions to the vector of timing
and auxiliary variable observations. We use Javassist [25] to
produce P ′ and obtain a set of auxiliary variable vector Z
for each secret. Given an upper-bound K on the number of
clusters as well as an arbitrary distance function d with the
indistinguishably distances ε, we implement FDClustering
to discover k classes of observations (k ≤ K). This clustering
is an instantiation of non-parametric functional clustering [4].
Using the auxiliary variables as features and the functional
clusters as labels, we apply CART decision tree in scikit-learn
library [26] to implement DiscLearning.
FDClustering. We use two algorithms for clustering: hierar-
chal [27] and constrained K-means [28].
Preparation. We obtain timing functions from the discrete
timing vector. Then, we use a given distance function d to
obtain the distance matrix D that includes distance between
any timing functions. We specify cannot-link constrains over
the matrix D. Cannot-link constraints disallow two functions
that are more than ε far to be in the same cluster.
constrained K-means. Given the upper bound K over the
number of observational classes (K is less than number of
secret values), constrained K-means algorithm [29] obtains k
clusters in each iteration (k = 1 in the first iteration). If the
algorithm could not find k clusters with the given cannot
constraints, it increases k to k + 1 and runs the algorithm
again (if k <= K). Otherwise, it returns cluster object
F = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fk〉. It has been known that constrained
K-means with cannot-link constraints is computationally in-
tractable [30]. Constrained K-means algorithm internally uses
constraints to discover clusters.
Hierarchical clustering. The clustering algorithm with com-
plete link method [31] obtains k clusters in each iteration (k
= 1 in the first iteration). In each iteration, after clustering,
it checks that all pairs in cannot-link are in different clusters.
If the condition is not satisfied, it increases k to k + 1 and
run the algorithm again (if k <= K). Otherwise, it returns
F = 〈f1, f2, . . . , fk〉. Hierarchical clustering is agnostic to
constraints and the constraints are verified after the clustering.
Non-functional clustering. We extend the well-establish nonin-
terference implementation [32] to our setting with quantified
discovery of leaks. For every public input value, we form
cannot-link constrains and apply one of the clustering algo-
rithm with the infinity norm and an indistinguishably distance
ε. Finally, we choose the largest number of clusters among all
values of the public input.
DiscLearning. For each secret value, the evaluation of an
auxiliary variable is a function in the domain of public input.
We use B-spline functions to represent the auxiliary functions
in general, but we also allow to fit simpler functions such
polynomial functions. Then, we cluster the functions and use
the decision tree model to learn discriminant formulas.
B. Micro-benchmarks
We design synthetic micro-benchmarks to compare the two
clustering algorithms, evaluate the scalability of FUSCHIA, and
compare results (in term of discovered clusters) for functional
and non-functional clustering algorithms.
Programs. Two programs Zigzag and processBid are shown
in Figure 5. Two versions of guess secret applications
are considered. The applications Guess Secret 1 [33] and
Guess Secret 2 [34] (shown in Figure 5) take the secret
and guess as the inputs and execute different sleep commands
depending on the values of secret and guess. Six versions
of branch and loop are considered. One of these versions is
shown in Figure 5. Depending on the values of the secret
input, the program does different computations with different
complexities. There are four loop complexities: O(log(N)),
O(N), O(N.log(N)), and O(N2) where N is the public input.
Each micro-benchmark Branch and Loop i has all of these
four loop complexities, and there are i types of each loop with
different constant factors such as O(log(N)) and O(2.log(N)).
Clustering Parameters. We use both functional cluster-
ing (constrained K-means and hierarchical) as well as non-
functional clustering from Section V-A with different param-
eters to compare their results. For non-functional clustering,
we show the indistinguishably distance with ε∞. We consider
three types of instantiations for functional clustering: 1) Func-
tional timing models with the infinity norm and the indistin-
guishably distance εf∞; 2) The first derivative of the functional
timing models with the infinity norm and the indistinguishably
distance εf
1
∞ ; 3) The first derivative of the functional timing
models with 2-norm and the indistinguishably distance εf
1
2 .
We use the symbols K and T similar to the indistinguishably
distance symbol to show the number of observations, and the
computation time of the clustering algorithms for different
distance models and norms.
Clustering Comparison. We compare two functional clus-
tering algorithms proposed in Section V-A. Figure 6 shows
the comparison between hierarchical and constrained K-means
algorithms for Branch and Loop benchmarks. In particular,
the comparison shows that constrained K-means is computa-
tionally expensive, while the hierarchical clustering is much
more scalable. In addition, it shows that the constrained K-
means discovers more classes of observations than hierarchical
clustering. Note that the clusters discovered by both algorithms
are valid, and we prefer the one with lower number of clusters.
Scalability. We examine the scalability of FUSCHIA for
applications with different sizes of micro-benchmark such
as the number of recorded features and different sizes of
experiments such as the number of secret and public values.
To learn decision trees, we consider the largest number of
observational classes among all the clustering parameters and
evaluate the accuracy of tree models with 20-fold cross-
validation procedure. Table I shows the result of evaluations
for different micro-benchmarks. We can see that FUSCHIA
can handle programs with 100 classes of observations and
complex decision tree models in a reasonable amount of
time. In the worst case, it takes less than 30 seconds to
cluster timing functions. In addition, it takes less than a
second to learn the decision tree model. For the branch and
loop applications, the computation time is growing in linear
factor with respect to the size of applications and the size of
experiments. For Branch and Loop 6 application, it takes
less than 25 seconds to compute the clusters and learn decision
tree models where we have 24,192 test cases with a decision
tree model that has 48 unique leaves and the height of 92.
Clustering results. We evaluate the effects of the timing
models and the distance norm over the number of discovered
classes of observations. Table I shows that the non-functional
clustering accepts the security of Zigzag (found one cluster)
while the first derivative functional model rejects the security
of the application (found two clusters). In addition, in the
case of Guess Secret 1, Guess Secret 2, and processBid,
the functional clustering discovers that there are more classes
of observations than the ones discovered by non-functional
clustering. We can also see how the number of observations
are changing based on the timing functions and the distance
norm. For example, there are 8 classes of observations for
Branch and Loop 2 using the timing functions, while there
are 6 clusters using the first derivate of timing functions.
VI. CASE STUDIES
Table II summarizes seven real-world Java applications used
as case studies in this paper. Table II is similar to Table I
in Section V-B. Here, we consider functional observations
(with indistinguishability bound ε) and the first derivative of
Zigzag(int secret, int low){
if(secret % 2 == 0){
if(low % 2 == 0){
Thread.sleep(3);}
else {Thread.sleep(1);}}
else{ Thread.sleep(2);}}
proBid(int sec, int offer){
if (offer < secret){
return false;}
else {
recordBid(offer);
return true;}}
Guess_Sec_2(int secret,int low,int t){
if(low <= secret){
if(t == 1){Thread.sleep(1);}
else if(t == 2){Thread.sleep(10);}
else{Thread.sleep(1000);}
}else{
if(t == 1){Thread.sleep(1);}
else if(t == 2){Thread.sleep(100);}
else{Thread.sleep(1000);}}}
Branch_loop_1(int secret, int N){
if (secret < 100){for(int i = N; i > 0;){
Thread.sleep(0,1000); i /= 2;}}
else if (secret < 195){for(int i = 0;i<N;){
Thread.sleep(0,1000); i +=1;}}
else if (secret < 290){for(int i = 0;i<N;){
for(int j = N; j > 0;){
Thread.sleep(0,1000);j = j / 2;} i +=1;}
else if (secret < 400){for(int i = 0;i<N;){
for(int j = 0; j < N;){
Thread.sleep(0,1000); j +=1} i +=1;}}}
Fig. 5: Sample programs used in Micro-benchmark analysis.
TABLE I: Legends: #R: no. of recorded internal features, #S: no. of secret values, #P: no. of public values, ε∞ : tolerance
for non-functional clustering, εf∞ : tolerance for ∞-norm of the functional model, εf
1
∞ : tolerance for ∞-norm of the first
derivative of the functional model, εf
1
2 : tolerance for 2-norm of the first derivative of the functional model, #Kmodelnorm : the
number of clusters for the specified functional model and distance norm, #Tmodelnorm : the computation time (s) of clustering for
specified functional model and distance norm, A: accuracy of the tree model, H: height of the tree model, #L: number of
(unique) leaf nodes in the tree model, T: computation time for decision tree learning (s).
Benchmark # R #S #P ε∞ #K∞ T∞ εf∞ #Kf∞ Tf∞ εf
1
∞ #Kf
1
∞ Tf
1
∞ εf
1
2 #K
f1
2 T
f1
2 A #H #L T
Zigzag 13 100 20 0.001 1 0.2 0.001 1 0.1 0.001 2 0.1 0.001 2 0.2 100% 1 2 0.1
processBid 3 100 100 0.001 2 1.6 0.001 100 0.4 0.001 5 0.1 0.001 100 0.7 100% 20 100 0.1
Guess Secret 1 10 500 100 0.001 2 64.0 0.001 100 1.9 0.001 100 3.4 0.001 100 7.2 100% 21 100 0.1
Guess Secret 2 5 100 400 0.001 21 9.8 0.001 100 0.8 0.001 100 2.3 0.001 100 2.6 97.2% 19 100 0.1
Branch and Loop 1 4 36 21 0.1 4 0.2 0.1 4 0.1 0.1 3 0.1 0.1 3 0.1 100.0% 3 4 0.1
Branch and Loop 2 8 72 21 0.1 8 0.4 0.1 8 0.1 0.1 6 0.1 0.1 7 0.2 98.7% 7 8 0.1
Branch and Loop 3 16 144 21 0.1 12 1.7 0.1 14 0.2 0.1 7 0.2 0.1 12 0.4 99.0% 13 14 0.1
Branch and Loop 4 32 288 21 0.2 22 7.9 0.2 22 0.7 0.2 13 0.7 0.2 13 1.3 100.0% 24 22 0.1
Branch and Loop 5 64 576 21 0.2 22 31.4 0.2 22 2.3 0.2 12 2.0 0.2 17 5.7 100.0% 48 22 0.1
Branch and Loop 6 128 1,152 21 0.2 23 207.7 0.2 23 9.2 0.2 48 12.7 0.2 45 24.5 100.0% 92 48 0.5
Fig. 6: (a) Computation time (constrained K-means com-
putationally expensive). (b) Number of discovered clusters
(Hierarchal clustering discovers fewer number of clusters).
functional timing models with 2-norm distance (with indis-
tinguishability bound ε1). The main research questions is the
following: Do functional clustering and decision tree learning
scale well and pinpoint code fragments related to leaks?
A) GabFeed. Gabfeed is a Java web application with 573
methods implementing a chat server [6]. The server takes
users’ public key (public input) and its own private key (secret
input) to generate a common key.
Inputs. The defender chooses a finite set of secret values and
public values. For this example, he randomly chooses 1,105
server’s private keys and 65 user public keys (uniformly spread
through the space of keys). In total, he uses 71,825 test cases.
Leakages. For each private key, FUSCHIA varies public keys
and measures the execution time of the server to generate
the common key (Fig. 7 (a)). Next, FUSCHIA creates timing
functions from the discrete timing observations and discovers
34 classes of observations with ε = 0.1 (Fig. 7 (b)).
Explanation. On the instrumented GabFeed, for each secret
value, FUSCHIA fits functions for each auxiliary variable. Fig-
ure 7 (c) shows the decision tree model learned for GabFeed.
Using this model, he realizes that the number of basic block
calls at line 18 of standardMultiply method explains
different classes of observations. The basic block executes
expensive shift left and add operations over BigIntegers. The
split value in the decision tree model is linear function of
the public input with different slopes. The functions are linear
since the basic block is triggered as the number of set bits
in the public key, and the slope of functions are determined
by the number of calls to the standardMultiply method
that depends on the number of set bits in the secret key minus
one. This vulnerability is an instance of timing leaks in the
square-and-multiply algorithm [1].
Mitigation. The clustering over the first derivative timing
functions found 32 classes of observations with ε1 = 0.01.
This indicates the leaks over the shape of functions for remote
attackers. Let’s assume the defender quantizes (mitigates)
execution time [35] where the mitigator releases the events
at certain times like {4.5,9,13.5,. . .}. Figure 7 (d) shows 27
classes of observations discovered after applying this mitigator.
Highlights. The decision tree model explains the calls to an
expensive basic block is linear function of public input where
the slope depends on the secret inputs. The clustering over
mitigated observations shows a slight reduction in the strength
of leaks. The overall algorithm takes less than 75 seconds.
B) SnapBuddy. SnapBuddy is a mock social network appli-
cation where each user has their own pages with a photo-
graph [36], [11]. In this application, the public profile is public
input, and the identity of users is secret input.
Inputs. The defender considers 447 users in the system (with
secret identity) and changes the size of profile images as the
TABLE II: Case Studies. Legends similar to Table I in Sec. V-B except that M shows the number of methods in the application.
Benchmark #M #R #S #P εf2 #K
f
2 T
f
2 ε
f1
2 #K
f1
2 T
f1
2 A H #L T
Jetty 63 38 800 800 0.002 20 54.7 0.001 20 74.6 100% 9 20 0.1
GabFeed 573 43 1,105 65 0.1 34 56.7 0.01 32 40.8 99.6% 31 34 0.1
SnapBuddy 3,071 65 477 14 0.5 20 2.8 0.5 24 3.0 96.2% 21 20 0.1
ShareValue 13 7 164 41 0.01 29 0.5 0.005 13 0.5 99.3% 17 29 0.1
PowerBroker 306 44 8 2,048 0.1 6 26.0 0.1 3 86.8 81% 2 3 0.1
Collab 185 53 176 11 0.001 1 0.3 0.001 1 0.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Password Checker 6 3 10 21,123 0.001 4 0.1 0.001 4 0.1 99.9% 3 4 0.1
OptimizedMultiplier.standard
Multiply BasicBlock 18
OptimizedMultiplier.standard
Multiply BasicBlock 18
OptimizedMultiplier.standard
Multiply BasicBlock 18
= 3 ∗ y 6= 3 ∗ y
= 127 ∗ y 6= 127 ∗ y
= 251 ∗ y 6= 251 ∗ y
Fig. 7: (a) GabFeed initial functional data. (b) GabFeed functional data are clustered in 34 groups. (c) Learning decision tree
model. Different functional model of basic block at line 18 of standardMultiply method explains classes of observations.
(d) GabFeed functional data are mitigated with permitted slot of {q,2q,3q,...} (q=4.5) and clustered to 27 groups.
public inputs in the scale from 1 to 14.
Leakages. Figure 8(a) shows the download time functions of
users versus the public profile sizes. FUSCHIA discovers 20
classes of observations (ε=0.5) shown in Figure 8(b).
Explanation. Figure 8 (c) shows (part of) the decision tree
model that says users who do not apply any filter on their
images follow black cluster (the bottom cluster in Figure 8
(b)), while those apply oilFilter on their images are assigned
to red cluster (the top cluster in Figure 8 (b)).
Mitigation. FUSCHIA discovers 24 classes of observations with
ε1 = 0.5 over the first derivative functions. The defender
also uses the basic double scheme mitigator [35] that pre-
dicts the execution time at i−th slot of N−th epoch with
SN (i) = [tN + i.2
N ] where tN is the start time of the N−th
epoch (t0 = 4). Figure 8 (d) shows 10 classes of observations
discovered for a remote attacker after applying the double
scheme mitigation with ε1 = 0.5.
Highlights. The defender finds out filters can leak the identity
of users. In addition, the defender realizes that applying basic
double scheme reduces the strength of leaks. The clustering
and decision tree algorithms take less than 5 seconds.
C) Share Value. Share value application is the functional
extension of classical share value program studied in [37],
[38]. In this case, every user in the system has two types of
shares: public and private shares.
Inputs. The program has 63 users each with maximum 400
private shares. The user can have 1 to 400 public shares.
Leakages. FUSCHIA discovers 29 classes of observations with
ε = 0.01 as shown in Figure 9 (a). The clustering algorithm
takes less than 1 second.
Explanation. Figure 9(b) shows decision tree model that says
different intervals of calls to the remote data base cause the
leaks. The decision tree learning takes less than 1 second.
Mitigation. The defender sets the values of ε1 to be 0.005,
and FUSCHIA obtains 13 classes of observations over the first
derivatives. The defender also mitigates the leaks with permit-
ting the response times to occur at {1,2,3,etc}, and FUSCHIA
discovers 12 classes of observations with ε1 = 0.005.
D) PowerBroker. PowerBroker is a peer-to-peer program used
by power suppliers for exchanging power [39]. During the
connection setup, there is a step where the two peers exchange
RSA public keys.
Inputs. The defender chooses 8 secret inputs (RSA Keys) and
2,048 public inputs (messages need to be decrypted) using
AFL fuzzer [40] and the domain knowledges.
Leakages. FUSCHIA takes the indistinguishable distances ε1 =
0.1 and discovers three classes of observations over the first
derivative of timing functions as shown in Figure 9 (c). The
clustering algorithm takes less than 90 seconds.
Explanation. Figure 9(d) shows the decision tree model
learned for PowerBroker that pinpoints the basic block at line
97 of montgomeryMultiply method discriminates green
cluster from other two clusters. The decision tree learning
takes less than 1 second. PowerBroker uses the Chinese
Remainder Theorem based on the implementation in [41] that
can leak secret keys using attacks such as [42].
E) Collab. Collab is a scheduling application that allows users
to create new events and modify existing events [43]. An audit
events is a secret, while other events are public.
Inputs. The defender considers 176 users each has either
no or one audit event. The defender consider 11 operations
(combination of add and commit) over public events.
Leakages. FUSCHIA discovers only one cluster for both timing
functions and the first derivative of timing functions with ε and
ε1 to be as small as 0.001. In this example, given the input
traces (finite sets of public and secret values), the defender
model.Filter.
filter
image.OilFilter.
filterPixels
image.ChromeFilter.
access
image.AbstractBuffered
ImageOp.getRGB
image.BicubicScaling
Filter.filter
image.FlipFilter
.filter
= 0 = 1
= 1= 0
= 1= 0
= 0 = 1
= 1 = 0 = 0 = 1
Fig. 8: (a) SnapBuddy functional data: time functions correspond to users, (b) Data are clustered in 20 groups, (c) Calls to
filter functions are discriminants, and (d) Mitigation with double scheme and clustered to 10 groups.
shareValueCalculator.
remoteDBConnection
shareValueCalculator.
loadKeys
shareValueCalculator.
remoteDBConnection
<= 33 > 33
<= 26> 26
<= 53 > 53
MontgomeryMultiplier.
montgomeryMultiply bblock 97
<= 229 > 229
Fig. 9: (a) Share Value functional data clustered in 29 groups, and (b) its discriminant (calls to remote database). (c) PowerBroker
functional data clustered in 3 groups and (d) its discriminant (basic block on line 97 of montgomeryMultiply).
concludes that the program is not leaking any information.
The clustering algorithm takes less than 1 second.
F) Password Checker. We consider a password checker that
uses string equality checker from [44].
Inputs. The defender uses libFuzzer [10] that generates 21,123
guesses for 10 randomly selected password. We assume the
length of password is at most 6 lower-case alphabet.
Leakages. FUSCHIA discovers 4 classes of observations for
both timing functions and the first derivative of timing func-
tions where ε = 0.001 and ε1 = 0.001. The clustering
algorithm takes less than 1 second.
Explanation. The number of basic block at the entry of the
loop that compares the candidate and password strings explain
different classes of observations. The decision tree learning
takes less than 1 second.
VII. RELATED WORK
Noninterference. Noninterference was first introduced by
Goguen and Meseguer [16] and has been widely used to
enforce confidentiality properties in various systems [17],
[18], [45]. The work [6] defines ε bounded noninterference
that requires the resource usage behavior of the program
executed from the same public inputs differ at most ε. The
functional noninterference allows us to consider various notion
of distance norms on noise models and mitigation policies.
Detection of information leaks. Various techniques have been
used to detect information leaks [46], [32], [6]. Molnar et
al. [32] propose program transcript model to detect timing
side channels. This model captures a class of side-channel
attacks in which the adversary can see the entire control-flow.
Molnar et al. [32] do not quantify classes of observations.
Quantification of information leaks. The amount of in-
formation leakage can be estimated based on quantitative
information flow techniques [19], [47], [46]. The works [20],
[21] give an upper bound on the amount of information leakage
based on side-channel observations. In particular, Ko¨pf and
Du¨rmuth [20] prove that the amount of information leakage is
bounded from above by |O|log2(n + 1) bits, where O is the
number of distinct classes of observations, and n is the number
of measurements by the attacker. Our clustering algorithm uses
this bound to show the strength of leaks.
Hardening against timing side channels. Previous works
study methods to eliminate timing leaks [37], [48], [49] and to
mitigate timing side channels [20], [35], [50]. The work [35]
introduces different schemes to mitigate timing side channels.
We use these schemes in our functional setting to show
possible classes of observations after the mitigation.
Statistical Learning for program performance analysis.
Machine learning techniques have been used for detecting
and explaining performance bugs in software [11], [12],
[51]. Tizpaz-Niari et al. [12] consider performance issues
in softwares. They also cluster execution times of programs
and then explain what properties of program distinguish the
different functional clusters. Their work is limited to linear
functions as it needs to discover functions, while we support
arbitrary functions . Further, they analyze performance, while
we focus on confidentiality. Time series have been used for
profiling and failure detection [52], [53], [54], [55]. In
particular, Hauswirth et al. [53] group the traces of the same
input together. If there is a pattern like sudden instruction-per-
cycle changes, they align all executions using dynamic time
warping (DTW) [56] and apply statistical correlation to find
properties that are linked to the changes. In contrast, we use
(different forms of) functional data analysis for confidentiality.
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